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Being Earnest with Collections — What Happens
After Short-Term Loan Withdrawal
by Carol Joyner Cramer (Head of Collection Management, Z. Smith Reynolds Library, Wake Forest University)
<cramercj@wfu.edu>
Column Editor: Michael A. Arthur (Associate Professor, Head, Resource Acquisition & Discovery, The University of
Alabama Libraries, Box 870266, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487; Phone: 205-348-1493; Fax: 205-348-6358) <maarthur@ua.edu>
Column Editor’s Note: If your library is
managing a demand driven acquisitions program then you have probably experienced the
frustration caused when publishers decide all
or some titles will not be available for shortterm loans. At The University of Alabama,
we began a vibrant DDA plan early in 2016.
Initially the plan was set to purchase on first
trigger. We later changed to the STL model
because we wanted to determine over the long
term if STL would be more cost efficient than
outright purchase. Our decision resulted in
the removal of several titles from our DDA
pool on the EBSCO platform. Fortunately,
EBSCO manages that process so it was not
labor intensive. However, it left us wondering
what impact this change would have on coverage within certain disciplines and whether
or not the bulk of lost titles would come from
small and university presses. We continue to
review our plan and evaluate it based on a
number of factors. The size of our DDA program necessitates that we use due diligence
to ensure that title selection is as diverse as
possible. I was pleased when Carol agreed
to provide ATG readers with the results of her
study at Wake Forest University. This article
will answer some questions and lead others
to pursue similar studies. — MA

M

y library loves the Short-Term Loan
(STL) model of Demand-Driven Acquisition (DDA). Publishers, however, may have mixed feelings. So a publisher
pulls its frontlist (<1 year old) content out of
the STL program. We react by dropping the
affected content from our DDA pool. What
happens next?
The Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake
Forest University supports a relatively small
FTE enrollment, but we have a relatively
generous monograph budget when viewed on
a per-FTE basis. Under those circumstances,
a DDA and STL purchase plan makes a lot of
sense. We have a broad-ranging plan in terms
of subject coverage and per-loan spending
caps. The only content restriction is on books
flagged as “Juvenile” or “Popular” by GOBI
Library Solutions. Because our pool is so
large compared to our FTE, only a tiny percentage of the books in the pool ever receive
any use. As publishers increased their prices
for STLs over the last few years, we watched
this trend with dismay (no one wants to pay
more), but we reluctantly realized that the
prices we enjoyed back in 2011 were probably
unsustainable for publishers.
Sometime in our fiscal year 2015, a major
trade publisher (“Publisher A”) removed its
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frontlist titles from the STL model with our
provider Ebook Library (or “EBL” as it
was then, now known as ProQuest Ebook
Central). Therefore, to keep these books in
the DDA pool, we would have to purchase the
book at full price upon the first use. In what
was perhaps an emotional reaction, the Reynolds Library decided to remove the frontlist
books from our DDA pool entirely. We also
removed content of any subsequent publisher
who enacted the same or similar restrictions.
We knew price increases were inevitable.
However, setting the price at 100% for the
first use was just too high. Even as we were
removing these titles though, we recognized
that we could be making a huge mistake. Sure,
our DDA spending with Publisher A would go
down, but what if our 28 subject liaison-selectors simply purchased more print from this
publisher to compensate? After all, we knew
that some (although not all) liaisons would
notice in GOBI’s system that we had a DDA
book available and would choose another book
— thereby punishing publishers who made
their frontlist available. On the other hand, by
not having their titles before our users in our
DDA pool, perhaps Publisher A would realize
even less revenue than before. This was all
speculation however. What really happened?
I set myself to find out.
As I mentioned, the change occurred in
fiscal year 2015 (July 1, 2014-June 30, 2015 —
henceforth FY15). So I chose to compare the
sales that Publisher A realized from Reynolds
Library in the year before the change, FY14,
to the year after, FY16. Then I pulled the same
data for another trade publisher, “Publisher B,”
who did not change their participation in STLs
before June 30, 2016.
Table 1 presents a few basic facts about our
campus size and book budget. I have given
two FTE numbers, as we have law and medical students who are served by independent
campus libraries. However, these students may
use our DDA pool, and we do not restrict law
and medical content from our pool. Across
the study period, the Reynolds Library had
budget increases that we could partially apply
to monographs. As indicated in Table 2, we directed most of these increases toward the DDA
slice of the budget, while keeping firm-order
funds flat and slightly cutting approvals.
The Collection Management unit does not
dictate to our liaisons any policy regarding
duplication of titles. Liaisons may purchase
both print and electronic — or only one preferred format — depending on the needs of
their specific department. Likewise, when
Publisher A and other publishers dropped out
of STLs, I announced the change, but did not

dictate any specific action that liaisons needed
to take in response. Therefore, I could assess
what happened naturally.

Data Collection

Since the DDA decision had no impact on
our journal subscriptions, I confined my project
to the monographs side of the budget. I also
ignored STL/DDA spending on backlist books,
since backlist books were not impacted by
Publisher A’s decision. Therefore, I examined
these types of purchases:
• Approval shipments of print
• Firm-order print purchases
• STL spending on frontlist titles
• DDA triggered purchases of frontlist
titles
• Firm-order eBook purchases
To keep the focus on books, I excluded nontext formats such as films and music scores. I
retrieved our total spend on monographs from
our Voyager ILS, in which we use reporting
funds to flag content types.
To see specifically what we purchased from
Publishers A and B, we requested imprint-level
data from GOBI Library Solutions.1 GOBI
identified which imprints corresponded to these
two publishers. While we do use other book
vendors beside GOBI, practically all of our
frontlist purchases from these two publishers
would be sourced from GOBI. Statistics on
EBL eBook usage and costs came from the
EBL statistics module.

Results

The results for Publisher A (which dropped
out of STLs) are summarized in Table 3. As
you can see, for Publisher A the $3,094 in STL
spend from FY14 was almost exactly displaced
by $3,151 in firm-order eBook purchases.
So Reynolds Library spent practically the
same money, but got access to many fewer
books for our pains. Interestingly, there was
practically no effect on spending on firm-order
print books, which means that liaisons did not
respond to this situation by choosing to buy
more print from Publisher A.
The results for Publisher B (which remained in the STL program) are summarized
in Table 4. Publisher B had a sharp increase
in DDA spending. A look at the title-by-title
data revealed that Publisher B responded to
the STL crisis by dramatically raising the perSTL price instead of dropping out of program
entirely — at least during the time under study.
At Reynolds Library, the median STL cost
from Publisher B rose from $13.82 to $32.33
per STL instance. As a result, the total amount
continued on page 64
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spent with Publisher B increased despite accessing
fewer titles.
Another way to look at this data is to think about
each publisher’s share of Reynolds Library’s monograph spending. As I stated above, our book spending
had risen in FY16 as compared to FY14, and most
of that increase came from the DDA category. Table 5 shows what happened to each publisher when
viewed in the light of our entire book spend. So for
Publisher A, dropping out of DDA meant a decline
in their “market share” of our spending. Publisher B
also dropped in “market share,” but not as sharply.

Table 1: FTE and Monograph Spending FY14 vs. FY16

Table 2: Reynolds Library Monograph Spending by Type: FY14 vs. FY16

Discussion and Conclusion

So what did we learn? In a way, all parties lost.
Both publishers lost in “market share.” (I did not
investigate whether this was due to a single “Publisher C” gaining more sales, or sales spreading out
among more publishers, or some other combination
of factors.)
Publisher A’s strategy of dropping out of STLs
worked in the sense that we purchased individual
eBooks that offset FY14 spending. However, Publisher A missed the opportunity to gain more sales
as Reynolds Library directed budget growth in the
direction of DDA. Publisher B also lost “market
share,” but its strategy of raising STL prices was
more successful than dropping out of the STL model
entirely. Reynolds Library spent the same amount
of money with Publisher A, but lost access to a broad
swath of titles. Had Reynolds Library not dropped
Publisher A’s offerings, we would not have been able
to afford the program — especially as other publishers
also dropped out of the STL program.
Since the study period ended, ProQuest has
re-branded EBL as EBook Central and more recently
has released the “Access-to-Own” model. By setting a
higher price for the first use, ProQuest is moving closer towards the model adopted by Publisher B during
the study term. The long list of publishers that have
agreed to participate in the Access-to-Own model2
implies that publishers are willing to try this model.
Wake Forest University may not be a typical
customer. Is it more normal in this day and age for
libraries to cut monograph budgets instead of increasing them? Publishers may be designing their pricing
strategies based on a customer profile that is very
different from us. Also, the publisher’s profit margin
is almost certainly not identical across different distribution channels, e.g., DDA through ProQuest vs.
sales on its own eBook platform. However, as I was
not made privy to these differential profit margins, I
could not take them into account.
Since Reynolds Library gleans a lot of value from
the STL and DDA models, we will continue investing
in it as long as possible. However, as purchasing
options evolve, we will need to adapt our selection
practices in response.
Endnotes
1. I am grateful to Steve Hyndman and his
colleagues at GOBI Library Solutions for their
assistance in gathering data for this analysis.
2. Available publicly at http://media2.proquest.com/
documents/access-to-own-publisherlist.pdf.
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Table 3: Spending for “Publisher A,” who Dropped STL

Table 4: Spending for “Publisher B,” who Retained STL

Table 5: Share of Reynolds Library Monograph Spending for Each Publisher
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